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Abstract 
 
The paper opens up the issue of how to relate culture to class in the UK. First, 
problematizing the conflation of class with status – inherent to stratification models 
like the GBCS – we theorise culture as ‘world-making’ rather than artistic or 
individual possession. Second, exploring culture in the wake of reforms aimed at local 
and institutional ‘cultures’ – said to hold back economic growth – we explore power 
relations between class and culture. After clarifying how Weber’s analysis of 
stratification keeps economic relations underpinning class distinct from the cultural 
mores of status groups, we point to a third dimension in his emphasis on parties – 
across all modes of life – as the ‘house of power’. Contrary to his supposition of 
homogeneity, however, we suggest legitimation today requires contesting parties, 
including factions and interest groups, to recruit from across class and status groups. 
Arguing recruitment here is enhanced by a mood of endless reform – in which 
modernity appears bent on tearing up its own foundations – we indicate how the 
resulting sense of precariousness is augmented by the stratifying technologies of 
grading and ranking. The pertinent question is: Who benefits from endless reform? 
And if the answer is no more than to recognise how benefits are skewed to an ‘elite’ 
working on behalf of owners of capital, then it is time to put aside stratification for an 
analysis of class relations that pointedly attends to wider notions of culture by asking: 
Who gets the say in world-making? 
 
Key words: class, culture, modernity, parties, power, precariousness, reform, 
stratification, world-making 
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Uprooting Class? Culture, world-making and reform 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In theorising the welter of contemporary reforms aimed at UK institutions as 
bringing about a general sense of precariousness, our aim is to explore culture as 
world-making (Bourdieu, 1989) and so avoid treating consumption as limited to Ǯplacingǯ others in terms of class. Certainly any reading of each other in terms of 
class – pervasive as it is often imperceptible (Pascale, 2008) – is critical to an 
enactment of culture that grounds itself in terms of such concerns as: ǮWho is she 
to me?ǯ But what matters to Bourdieu, as it did to Weber, is to ask who gets the 
say over which Ǯworldsǯ get created and reproduced? And who, in consequence, 
gets marginalised, disadvantaged and even abandoned? 
  
In beginning with Bourdieuǯs insights on world-making – rather than his notes 
on different forms of capital – we stress the issue is not differentials in the 
consumption patterns that stem from class divisions but rather the agency which 
structures such as class grant over what he calls Ǯworld-makingǯ (Bourdieu, 
1989). This is relevant when the relations underpinning class appear up for 
grabs – when class-making itself is in flux. In the minutiae of battles over which 
is the next bridge and how best to cross it, it is not class alone that helps grant 
agency. What matters in the struggle for power is how parties (those factions and 
interest groups contesting each other across all modes of life) disseminate 
agency as they reorder themselves and their agendas around the issue of Ǯreformingǯ institutions and Ǯmodernisingǯ cultural mores.  
Critically, neo-liberal inspired reforms in the UK have been reversing any 
virtuous flows in the circle of wealth since the 1980s. The outsourcing of 
production (relegating manufacturing to the global economy), the policy of 
importing cheap labour (holding down wage demands), changes in the law such 
as the Landlordǯs Act of 1988 (transferring occupancy advantages from tenants 
to landlords), and curbing sanctions available to the Unions (outlawing for 
instance Ǯsympathyǯ strikes), have all radically altered the balance of power 
between capital and labour. Also significant is the huge switch in taxation policy 
away from Ǯredistributionǯ towards Ǯincentivesǯ, where the latter slants rewards 
to those deemed to help economic growth. Far from asymmetries in wealth being 
culturally unacceptable, inequalities are now maximised through a bewildering 
range of bonus payments, investment incentives and tax breaks – all 
consolidated through historically low rates of income tax for top earners.  
 
Our concern is therefore to extend understandings of culture by taking account 
of these changes and so move beyond theories reliant on patterns of 
consumption as defining class differentials. Picking up on the turn to 
consumption in sociology since the 1980s, it is arguable that capitalism has been 
re-appropriating identity away from the mid-20th century class relations 
explored by Bourdieu (see also Skeggs, 2011). Similarly it is possible that what 
Thrift (2012) calls the Ǯnew industrialisationǯ is re-forging belongings into a 
more nuanced and targeted production. Recognising that social groupings do use 
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goods as materials to evidence identity and belonging (Douglas and Isherwood 
1980), we focus more on the pressing question of what conduct and belonging 
gets made acceptable by the few – in their chase for power or wealth – and ask 
how is advancement mobilised and made possible for some and not for others?  
 
In thinking through the relations between class and culture as world-making, we 
draw on our studies of on-going reforms of institutions within the UK over the 
last thirty years. As we explain, the process of a modernity bent on tearing up its 
roots – and so making almost everyone precarious – alters how advantage is 
commodified or acquired. For example, a key building-block of modernity – 
central to much 19th and 20th century political philosophy in the US – is not 
merit; assessment of which is likely skewed by educational privilege (Young, 
1958). Instead, the demanding relation is Ǯresponse-abilityǯ (Latimer, 1999), a 
readiness to answer calls by contesting parties to work on modernityǯs 
formations, rather than simply benefit from them. Far from a free lunch, 
opportunities for world-making involve would-be members attaching 
themselves to one agenda or another whenever a call for this or that reform is 
issued. 
 
Here we outline how technologies of grading and ranking help dominant parties, 
including all kinds of factions and interest groups, to recruit new members by 
first sensitising employees to success and failure and, second, by alerting them to 
how advancement is tied to Ǯdeliveryǯ of reform agendas.  In such ways do reform 
and reconfiguring intensify a sense of precariousness by inciting and intensifying 
competitiveness over success and achievement, whereby a Premier League 
rating indexes anything from a footballer to a research paper. Rankings alone, of 
course, do not form class. Rather, class thrives on relations; and, while smart 
technologies work alongside audit cultures to excite competition in the 
quantification and ranking of self and others (Swan, 2012), it is only if people 
engage with forms of grading – as cultural devices to self-identify and make 
visible their value to others – that status indicators map into class.   
 
Ahead of examining Savage et alǯs (2013) interpretation of the BBC class survey, 
we discuss how key features of contemporary culture come to the fore through 
endless programmes of reform. After returning to how Weber (1978) 
distinguishes status from class, and establishes the link between parties and 
power, we outline how abandoning Ǯbenign capitalismǯ makes way for a cultural 
dynamics in which struggles between parties centre on vested interests created 
by an Ǯuprootingǯ of modernityǯs foundations. We then consider how class 
relations get altered and appropriated in ways that enable reform to act as a key 
instrument through which parties muster recruits to deliver such demands as 
transparency and efficiency.  
 
 
Uprooting and modernity 
Modernity has become a suitable case for treatment. Calls for reform that deliver 
economic growth become strident when technological progress appears failing. 
Noting how America picked off the Ǯlow-hanging fruitǯ, Nigel Thrift argues for a 
new impetus to capitalism:  
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To escape this technological plateau, and to produce a new round of accelerated 
productivity and profitability born out of gains from knowledge and innovation, therefore 
requires a fundamental reorganization of how the world is (Thrift, 2012: 143). 
This Ǯfundamental reorganisationǯ is no longer a case of rivers being damned up 
or the industrialisation of agriculture that concerned Heidegger (1993). Instead, 
much world-making is aimed at institutions and cultural mores, since it is people 
who are deemed to be holding up progress. As Arendt (1998) anticipates, it is the 
human condition that is to be uprooted and reformed. 
 
This tendency towards reform and reorganisation is so prevalent as to have led 
Beck et al (2003) to characterise modernity as Ǯreflexiveǯ. Their diagnosis is that 
late modernity is directed at itself. Rather than celebrate a multiplication of 
boundaries (such as stretching class categories from 5 to 7), they advocate 
grasping the conditions in which modernity is seeking to reform its own 
foundations. Consider, for instance, how far enlightenment values underpinning 
Western ideals have been eroded. Against all men (sic) being equal, the Ǯtrickle downǯ ideology of neo-liberalism extols how the many are beholden to the few.  
Our point is that reforms aimed at bringing about new rounds of Ǯaccelerated 
productivity and profitabilityǯ are predicated on righting reforms of the past. For 
example, the rationale of looking to the future (cf Giddens, 1998: 940) ends up 
with modernity, in the spirit of reform, turning to destroy its past. Hence instead 
of Ǯgoing forwardǯ, as one expects, much reform turns out, perversely, to be about 
looking backwards. For some this is to deconstruct meta-narratives (Lyotard, 
1984); for others the agenda is to demystify the professions (Freidson, 1970). As 
frequently, however, it becomes a case of setting about to destroy the Ǯcultureǯ of 
institutions across commerce, education, healthcare and government (Latimer, 
2000; Munro, 1998).  
Where nothing is sacred, such as earlier reforms to education and public health, 
it is not techno-scientific innovation driving this spate of reform. Rather devices 
of grading and ranking are the cri de coeur of this latest phase of modernity. As 
illustrated by a rise of audit (Strathern, 2000a), an ever-deepening engagement 
with the calculative puts in place managerial technologies linked to Ǯresponsibilisationǯ and Ǯaccountabilityǯ (Munro and Mouritsen, 1996). Indeed, 
when reform looks beyond its ideological bent of Ǯliberalisingǯ markets and 
becomes a cataclysmic mode for Ǯrectifyingǯ prior reforms, there is an impending 
chaos in which private and public sector institutions find themselves constantly 
reconfigured on the basis that they Ǯcannot stand stillǯ. 
 
Alongside once-vaunted corporations like Tesco proclaiming they Ǯreinvent themselvesǯ, individuals are incited to Ǯunlockǯ their assets and become Ǯenterprisingǯ in the business of continuous makeovers. This is not only to note 
how people directly work for capital by becoming 'entrepreneurial selvesǯ 
(Sennett, 1998) or 'entre-employees', with the will to succeed colonizing every 
aspect of life (Bührmann, 2005). It is to note how everything – from leisure time 
to green belt land to genes – is up for grabs. Yet far from reform upon reform 
resulting in a relativism of Ǯanything goesǯ – a super-tolerance of lifestyle 
wherein oppositional class relations become inert – we think it more correct to 
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identify a social contract in the throes of Ǯeverything goesǯ, even and especially 
what was once highly valued (cf. Bauman, 2005).  
 
 
Reform and the BBC class survey  
 
Into this picture of endless reform, a new set of Ǯclassesǯ was marketed by the 
BBC from the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) and presented as Ǯaddingǯ two 
new classes to the British National Statistics Socio-Economic classification (NS-
SEC). This Ǯsurvey experimentǯ (Savage et al, 2013) has led to debate on the 
methods validity of its findings. For us, however, the GBCS is more problematic, 
first because of its reliance on an abbreviated version of culture and second 
because the GBCS prolongs the search for a modern version of class that depends 
on models of stratification.  
 
Stratification models like the NS-SEC – as we discuss below – conflate class with 
status. This is not least because the effacement of economic struggles between 
workers and bourgeoisie, not to mention its elision of remnants of feudal 
rankings, prolongs unresolved debates about Ǯconflictualǯ positionings 
(Holmwood and Stewart, 1983; Wright, 1985). Moreover, in combining the twin 
dimensions of employment and wealth, the NS-SEC takes the post-war stability 
of social structures more or less for granted. Its socio-economic grading of 
people is problematic because, in combining position and possession, it 
incorporates presumptions of a stable and unchanging culture that puts 
professions at the top and unskilled labour at the bottom.  
 
Savage et alǯs (2013) main ploy is to augment models that depend on social and 
economic assets with Bourdieuǯs notion of cultural capital. Here culture becomes 
another form of possession or resource (Savage et al, 2005).  It is worth recalling 
however that, for Bourdieu, much of what he identified in the 1970s as cultural 
capital (as distinct from social and economic capital) was associated with 
education (see also Serres and Wagner, this volume). As far as France was 
concerned, the agency education gave in terms of Ǯworld-makingǯ had to be 
reckoned with (cf Bourdieu, 1989). While culture for Bourdieu, as an 
anthropologist, has a much wider range of meanings than what is learnt in 
schools, he took education, at the time of writing Distinction, to be one of the 
pillars of class. Specifically, he saw education as granting a different kind of Ǯsocial powerǯ to that exercised by the rich. His appraisal of class in France is thus 
of two countervailing hierarchies, one built on wealth and economic power and 
the other pivoting on cultural influence and educational attainment.  
 
Contrastingly and germane to understanding differences with Bourdieuǯs (1984) 
study, there was a different narrative dominating UK politics. This was 
sometimes referred to as Ǯbenign capitalismǯ and figured supposedly around a 
redistribution of wealth in which wages were rising and the rich were being 
taxed out of existence. True, sizable profits still went to capital, but to the extent 
capital was said to lie in the hands of the pension funds, it was arguable that the 
19th century picture of wealth being appropriated by exploitative capitalists was 
out-dated. In place of an oppositional division of class between workers and 
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owners of capital, it had become possible for proselytisers of benign capitalism 
to paint an impression of a circular flow of wealth in which everyone was 
expected to benefit. This picture of stability and mutual benefit thus helped pave 
the way for a version of stratification that centred on social mobility up the 
employment ladder.  
 
Given the abandonment of benign capitalism (aided by deregulation of the 
banking system), stratification models might be thought to have had their day. 
The shift in culture towards favouring a Ǯtrickle downǯ economics, in which the 
few benefit over the many, has put paid to dreams of a safer, more equal world. 
As investment vehicles, the pension companies, who were supposed to recycle 
profits back to the workers, now compete alongside hedge funds and private 
equity firms, to say nothing of the hoards held by oligarchs and super-rich.3 At 
the time of writing, the UK chancellor George Osborn is introducing Ǯreformsǯ 
that do away with the monopoly of pension funds by annulling the need for 
pensioners to take out annuities. In further allowing early access to pension pots, 
he seems intent on blowing a final hole in the picture of benign capitalism.  
 
In the rest of this paper we focus on four matters of concern in Savage et alǯs 
(2013) interpretation of the GBCS: 1) their reliance on an abbreviated version of 
culture, 2) their condensing two dimensions of stratification into single values, 3) 
their failure to address power by ignoring the third dimension of stratification, 
and 4) their limiting the issue of precariousness to their Ǯbottomǯ rank. Given our 
different take on culture, which we come to first, we argue that the notions of 
culture underpinning their contribution to the BBC class survey are much too 
restrictive and fail to pick up on orientations that reflect what is happening in 
modernity more generally. Critically, their elaboration on class overlooks how 
relations between agency and world-making are skewed by the endless reform 
of institutions and cultural mores in favour of economic growth.  
 
 
Culture: shifting from Ǯhabitsǯ and Ǯplaceǯ to Ǯpositionǯ and Ǯfaceǯ 
 
Our argument earlier tied culture to world-making, a view that has grown out of 
the work of Douglas (1986), who references the work of Nelson Goodman among 
others. In contrast, Savage et al (2013) rely on an abbreviated version of culture, 
one that uses consumption patterns to signify cultural capital and so place 
people on a scale of value and values. While consumption is certainly critical to 
modern society (cf Featherstone, 1982; Simmel, 1971), Savage et alǯs position 
disregards the way world-making notions of culture have undergone an 
apotheosis through the work of Adorno, Raymond Williams and Bourdieu, 
among others, from being a mere backdrop to social and economic matters to its 
current position of prominence.4   
 
                                                 
3 Figures from the Brookings institute for the period since 1998 imply the top 1% has 
got richer, with the top 0.1% getting even more rich and the top 0.01% doing best. 
4 Notably Becker (2009) favours Bourdieuǯs use of Ǯworldǯ over his concept of Ǯfieldǯ. 
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What we want to suggest is how an abbreviated understanding of culture goes 
hand in hand with the insistence on endless reform.  Ideas of culture are often 
reduced to custom and tradition, treating practices as if they were invariably 
inert and backward looking; presumptions captured in Strathernǯs (1993) ironic 
quip that Ǯculture is a dragǯ. And, yes, in the absence of pronounced social or 
topographical mobility, culture may well become static and recessive. As Mary 
Douglas explicates, taken-for-granted attitudes are at the heart of the dilemma 
for Trollopeǯs character when he asks his daughter: Ǯ(ow can I give you to a man 
I know nothing about?ǯ (Douglas and Isherwood, 1980: 89). The collapse of such – possibly spurious – local knowledge has given added importance to 
consumption. For example, a display of possessions, or activities, make up what 
Douglas and Isherwood call a Ǯlive information systemǯ (1980: xiv), to be read by 
others and through which a person can be Ǯplacedǯ.  
 
Whenever causal powers of culture are cast as negative, humans are expected to 
cast off belongings that anchor them to their Ǯpastsǯ and become susceptible to 
ways they can advance and achieve successful futures (Adams et al, 2009). In a Ǯforgettingǯ of what belonging might mean, much so-called reform assumes the 
human condition has to move on from being a Ǯstanding reserveǯ (Heidegger, 
1993) towards making oneself ready Ǯin advanceǯ – Ǯjust waitingǯ for the next 
challenge (Munro, 2004a). For example, a perceived failure in free education and 
health in the UK to generate economic growth, has brought about a sea change 
away from enlightenment ideals to their current status as industries ripe for 
reform. Significantly, reform not only gives up on working classes being Ǯcultivatedǯ along the lines Marshall (1951) took to be the Ǯcivilisedǯ middle class; 
it is the middle classes that are derided as deficient in terms of enterprise.  
 
Here we are stressing a doubling in contemporary conditions: a looking back on 
the one hand to tear up whatever limits economic growth, and on the other a 
looking forward by individuals towards their future success. While Ǯuprootingǯ 
through migration, colonisation and industrialisation (Hoskins 1988; Sennett 
1986; Bourdieu and Sayad 1964, 2015; Papadopoulos et al 2008) has a long 
history of making places of dwelling vulnerable, we are pointing therefore to a 
more deliberative uprooting than that marked by the picture of Ǯbuildingǯ 
replacing Ǯdwellingǯ (Heidegger 1993). What is seen to hold back progress are 
the habits in which people too easily make themselves Ǯat homeǯ in positions of 
employment and Ǯplaceǯ themselves in a drip-down schema as advantaged 
relative to others.  
 
In addition to ignoring this wider picture of reform (and the possibility of 
cultural capital as conceived by the GBCS being disadvantageous), Savage et alǯs 
(2013) reliance on the consumption of artistic activities and interests – as if 
these embody class sufficiently to signify division in the possession of cultural 
capital – makes an artefactual error. For example, it is surely wrong to equate 
culture solely with Ǯhighbrowǯ matters such as classical music, theatre going and 
the like, and overlook the great variety of other forms of class distinction? 
Similarly, it is misleading to adopt a Ǯdeficitǯ model (Francis and Hey, 2009; 
Skeggs, 2004) that reduces popular culture to football and soaps and associates 
these with working class interests. It is as if their social theory embraces a 
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conflation of culture with individual possession, forgetting culture is something 
accomplished together, with all its diversity and borrowings that characterize 
contemporary cultural performance (Oswald 1999; Strathern 1999).  
 
While culture is rightly seen as rooted in practices and customs, our view is that 
world-making (Bourdieu 1989) is tied more to Ǯpositionǯ, in the sense of having 
agency at a node in a network, than to Ǯplaceǯ, in the sense of either geography or 
social status. This said, anticipating our discussion on the importance of parties 
for the exercise of power, understandings of Ǯfaceǯ (Goffman, 1955; Munro, 2010) 
also appear ever more relevant, sociologically, to the notion of position. What 
matters today is how identity-work (Goffman, 1959), belonging (Garfinkel, 1967) 
and cultural performance (Munro, 1999) is activated through relations 
(Strathern 1995; Latimer and Munro, 2009). Here we stress how culture is open 
to a forging of new connections and bonds, as much as it may also preserve that 
which is inherited by way of cultural values, social networks and economic 
assets.  
 
While processes of inclusion and exclusion remain integral to understanding 
oppositional class relations, and connect to how culture and belonging get done 
on the ground, we are interested as much in how dwelling in modernity is turned 
towards identities that advertise persons as Ǯvisible and availableǯ (Latimer, 
2001; Munro, 2004b) to the contesting agendas of modernity; and so in doing 
animate the impetus for its reform. In this respect we are particularly concerned 
with how culture generates conditions for membership of classes that are in-the-
making, rather than are only about patrolling existing borders – as if these are 
fixed or preordained from what has gone before.  
 
 
Stratification: class and status groups  
 
Stratification models, as distinct from class division, are attributed to Max 
Weber. However, as his sub-title ǮClass, status, partyǯ makes clear, Weber (1978) 
distinguishes three dimensions of stratification. Far from conflating these into 
single values, he highlights the cultural mores ȋǮspecific style of lifeǯ, p.932) 
associated with a status group.  In emphasising the conduct demanded of those 
who would belong to a status group, Weber stresses understanding specific 
forms of culture alongside class. This attempt to give a fuller picture of societal 
division and distinction, distances him from Marxǯs positioning of culture as a 
superstructure that merely reflects the economic base.  
The significance of Weberǯs intervention can be seen, as already remarked, in the 
way Bourdieu (1984) counter-poses how those with cultural and educational 
standing in France mark themselves out from the merely wealthy. Weberǯs 
comments not only bring status groups alongside divisions between economic 
classes, critically they address how status groups are reproduced. The basis of 
stratification is however different: whereas classes are stratified Ǯaccording to 
their relations to the production and acquisition of goodsǯ, status groups are 
stratified Ǯaccording to the principles of their consumption of goodsǯ (Weber 
1978: 937). This thesis that consumption of goods displays special styles of life 
foreshadows the seminal work of Mary Douglas discussed earlier. Contrastingly, 
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Bourdieuǯs (1984) claim in Distinction is that it is cultural mores ȋǮspecific styles 
of lifeǯȌ that people use to distinguish Ǯclassǯ.  
Why the inclusion and exclusion exercised by status groups matters is because 
this puts culture and belonging at the heart of Ǯworld-makingǯ. As Bourdieu 
(1989) points out, reflecting back on Distinction, it is positional power that 
enables agents to engage in world-making. Critically, this clarification suggests it 
is not consumption per se that forms worlds. Rather it is the capacity to act as Ǯspokespersonsǯ, or activate others over how to see and make the world, that 
matters. The drift towards socio-economic grading, by contrast, more or less 
abandons any stress on struggle, or world-making, and leads to the creation of 
so-called Ǯzombie categoriesǯ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). This is because Ǯclassǯ loses its theoretical potency as a critical trope if it is conflated merely with 
the consumption patterns of status groups. This is especially the case when their 
distinct stratifying vectors are flattened out, as Savage et al (2013) do, into a 
single grading structure that measures neither class nor status.   
 
 
Power: parties and stratification 
As well as conflating class with status a further problem in the GBCS is that it 
obscures Weberǯs third dimension of stratification, namely parties. The key to 
understanding agency in world-making, we suggest, lies in Weberǯs (1978: 938) 
shift from a discussion on class and status groups to include parties:  
Whereas the genuine place of Ǯclassesǯ is within the economic order, the 
place of Ǯstatus groupsǯ is within the social order, that is, within the sphere 
of the distribution of Ǯhonorǯ. From within these spheres, classes and status 
groups influence one another and they influence the legal order and are in 
turn influenced by it. But Ǯpartiesǯ live in a house of Ǯpowerǯ. 
The shift in register to the last sentence is dramatic. Weber is moving away from 
reporting a mutual influence between classes and status groups. Instead, it is to 
the formation of parties that he turns to highlight the live use of power.  
Here it is worth re-reading Weberǯs (albeit brief) remarks on parties in the light 
of Bourdieuǯs insights over agency and world-making: 
Their action is oriented toward the acquisition of social Ǯpowerǯ, that is to 
say, toward influencing a communal action no matter what its content may 
be. In principle, parties may exist in a social Ǯclubǯ as well as in a Ǯstateǯ. 
(Weber 1978: 938) 
In contrast to either Scottǯs (1979), or Savageǯs (this issue) notion of an elite 
operating alone, it is parties that make class and status active by representing 
interests. As Weber emphasises, parties do their world-making by virtue of 
drawing on all kinds of stratification: 
In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through Ǯclass situationǯ or Ǯstatus situationǯ and they may recruit their following 
respectively from one or the other. But they need be neither purely Ǯclassǯ 
nor purely Ǯstatusǯ parties. (Weber 1978: 938) 
For all the analytic benefit there may be in separating economic, social and 
cultural forms of capital, Weber is implying parties, whether Ǯephemeral or enduringǯ are prone to exploit any manner of division and distinction.  
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Yet in order to present a face of democracy and diversity, parties can no longer 
be left as Weber imagined them. For parties to gain legitimation today over their 
agendas, they must be seen to be representing the interests of all classes and all 
status groups. Critically, in the contemporary culture to which we are pointing, 
there is a concomitant dismantling through reform of either Ǯstatusǯ or Ǯclassǯ 
preordaining agency. Instead, in order to progress their agendas of reform, 
parties need to re-form themselves into networks by crossing over the 
boundaries of status and class and enrol members who are in positions, however 
temporarily, to activate their agendas.  
 
Precariousness: grading and reform 
 
In tying precariousness to their Ǯbottomǯ rank, the GBCS also obscures many 
unsettling effects generated by conditions of endless reform. A more general 
sense of precariousness, we suggest, intensifies ontological insecurities, 
proliferating conditions of possibility wherein identities have to be made anew 
and ever more fragile footings found for belonging. While sociology examines 
how UK institutions, including schools and the NHS, fared under internal 
markets, deregulation and outsourcing in the public sector (e.g. Clarke et al 
2000), our own studies suggest that far from reforms being progressive, in any 
meaningful sense, much reconfiguration disseminates a sense of precariousness 
that is pernicious and destructive.5    
 
Such destructive aspects to reform put into question Savage et alǯs (2013) extra 
class they call the Ǯprecariatǯ.  Attributions of security that once separated 
salaried employees from waged seem no longer tenable. This is to emphasise 
how many Ǯreformsǯ affecting institutions appear aimed at making all forms of 
work temporary – at the heart of which is a knowing destruction of security 
through bidding systems for resources and appraisal through the endless 
technologies of grading and ranking. Tomorrow, if not today, the threat of 
redundancy hangs over white-collar workers. As with once-protected academics, 
reconfiguration only needs the announcement of a shift in Ǯstrategic directionǯ 
and redundancy is a done deal. Hence, without diminishing the perils of those 
without economic capital or social networks (and certainly current reforms of 
the welfare state threaten many living in the UK), precariousness has to be 
understood today as becoming an almost universal condition.  
 
What we are arguing here is how the constant process of reform both reduces 
security of employment and creates further openings for profit-making and 
exploitation. Although not everyone would agree, our impression of a reforming 
modernity is one in which whatever was once stable is now to be mobilised; and 
whatever was once valued is now to be reappraised. For instance, where status 
                                                 
5 Our ethnographies of the shifting ethos of management (Munro, 1995, 1998, 1999, 
2001, 2004a) and what is happening to care in the NHS (Latimer, 1999; 2000; 2001; 
show how this sense of precariousness extends to so-called employees (e.g. nurses, 
doctors, managers) as well as to so-called Ǯconsumersǯ (e.g. customers, patients).   
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groups, on Weberǯs formulation, could act as a bulwark against changing cultural 
mores, status groups, the professions – from Mrs Thatcher onwards (Rose and 
Miller, 1992) – became the target of this reforming modernity. If teachers were 
early casualties in this Ǯwar on privilegeǯ, with their pronounced fall in social 
status going alongside an erosion in their powers of discretion, other professions 
like doctors and nurses remain in the firing line and are in process of being 
proletarialized (Illiffe, 2008), with an on-going erosion of discretion and 
autonomy (Armstrong, 2002).  
 
In contrast to the stabilities underpinning stratification models, particularly in 
the era associated with benign capitalism, it is hard to think precariousness is 
other than the prevailing condition in this reforming modernity. For example, in 
our lifetime, university lecturing posts moved from Ǯtenureǯ to Ǯpermanentǯ 
employment and now to Ǯopen-endedǯ contracts. How long before zero-hour 
contracts are the norm with expectations of giving lectures anywhere at a momentǯs notice? Thus we not only stress how uprooting is unsettling, creating 
its own conditions of possibility for membership of class and status groups. As 
we suggest next, precariousness results in identity-work and belonging being 
appropriated and hijacked by an intensification in the forming and reforming of 
competing parties. 
 
 
Uprooting, parties & identity  
 
Wherever reform becomes the dominant agenda, two effects may be understood 
as operating together. First, there is the kind of uprooting through which 
contemporary life conditions become Ǯunsettlingǯ (Latimer, 2013), creating a 
precariousness in which identity or membership is no longer Ǯreadableǯ from 
lifestyle, consumption or other cultural practices. Second, there is an Ǯunhingingǯ 
of identities and belonging dictated by Ǯreformǯ hollowing out what has gone 
before – especially anything held sacred – and so creating lacunae, opportunities 
for the kind of division and distinction through which agendas of reform can be 
played out, and parties enhance their power.  
 
Integral to this unsettling of identity and unhinging of belonging, parties can be 
said to work on modernity as much as they work in modernity, refining their 
policies and re-spinning their promises. Indeed, inasmuch as the putative need 
for reform signals a failure to ever arrive at modernity (Latour, 1993), the path 
taken by parties is seldom towards one utopia or another, but is dictated instead 
by a politics about the next bridge to cross. What is held to count as progress by 
one party is contested by another; and so becomes integral to the Ǯpiecemeal 
tinkeringǯ (Popper, 1962: 1) on which the various parties make and remake their 
agendas of reform to attract allies across different networks and enrol further 
support (cf Latour, 1987).  
 
In this way, the need to recruit today from across classes and status groups, 
identified earlier, makes the standard notion of self-standing elites problematic. 
This is especially the case in the perceived need to enrol from across the 
particular class divisions we have identified earlier. Notably those in positions to 
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identify themselves as say offering transformational leadership – the Ǯproduct championsǯ and Ǯchange agentsǯ promising to Ǯturnaroundǯ aspirational as well as 
failing institutions – have to find ways to recruit people. Specifically, the 
ubiquitous elevation of policy and strategy over and above operations and 
delivery keeps top management separate and apart from the everyday 
experience within institutions. Those lower in the hierarchy are thus required to 
step up to the mark as Ǯresponse-ableǯ to calls for change and hold themselves 
out to their seniors as Ǯavailableǯ to deliver reform. Hence recruitment also 
affects those in operations and the front line; notably those who make 
themselves visible as ready to Ǯbuy intoǯ agendas and available to be held 
responsible for their Ǯdeliveryǯ.   
 
For this and other reasons, world-making nowadays transmutes from being a 
question of belonging to a specific status group – as in Weberǯs thinking – to one 
of gaining agency by virtue of enrolment in one party or another. As such, 
adherence to cultural mores (e.g. solidarity with colleagues) shifts to a perceived 
need to advertise oneǯs availability in the face of the latest Ǯcallǯ (e.g. how to Ǯlet goǯ of staff). In consequence, making oneǯs Ǯresponse-ablenessǯ visible and 
available to the requisite parties inevitably becomes as much a matter of face as 
it thrives on position in a network (Munro, 2015). The reliance on the kind of 
knowledge exhibited over the impossibility of marriage in Trollopeǯs novel, 
mentioned earlier, gives way to a dependence on the kind of facework discussed 
by Goffman (1959) in his analysis of the presentation of self and a reliance on the 
kind of account-giving that Garfinkel (1967) makes integral to an affirmation of 
membership through the Ǯpassingǯ of accounts (Latimer, 2004; Munro, 2001). 
 
Hence, rather than agency reflecting any homology in world-making with the Ǯimage of social positionǯ in Bourdieuǯs (1989) formulation of symbolic power, 
identity relies on cultural performance as much as on position. It is facework and 
account-giving that become reflexive to the often competing and contradictory 
calls and demands of parties in modernity; and so allow persons to morph 
ceaselessly between putative positions in their networks (Munro, 1999). What 
we are suggesting, then, is that when an analysis of class resorts to static and 
out-of-date notions of cultural capital, as with Savage et al (2013), they miss the 
effects and affects of a reflexive modernity in which a culture of reform restitutes 
domination of the many by the few through its uprooting effects.  
 
The culture of reform, characterized as it is by an uprooting of Ǯplaceǯ in favour of 
parties drawing together Ǯpositionsǯ in a network, neither relies on the kind of 
habitus drilled in by forms of schooling, or the kind of Ǯsystem of predispositionsǯ 
(Bourdieu, 1973: 80; Goldthorpe, 2006: 8) that may stem from Ǯbringing people upǯ in a distinct institutional ethos. Rather it is to the advantage of those charged 
with reform to promote into positions those who perform themselves as Ǯresponse-ableǯ – ready and able to deliver the calls that different Ǯpartiesǯ emit. 
People whose habitus exactly enables them to shift belongings and – unlike Bourdieuǯs men of the Bearn (see Wacquant, 2004) – Ǯunstickǯ their world in 
order to help forge another. People whose system of predispositions leave them 
ready and able – at a moments notice – to move on; detaching from one set of 
agendas and relations, while attaching to another set of agendas and relations.  
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Discussion: Class-making and Power 
 
The main point in raising these issues about identity and belonging is far from 
our suggesting that the Ǯrightǯ system of predispositions will guarantee 
advancement. To the contrary it is more that identities get performed in ways 
that increase the stock of persons making themselves consumable to those who 
hold sway in reforming parties. Thus in making this critique of Savage et al 
(2013), we think it is vital to recognise how culture in this reforming mode of 
modernity is now almost all-consuming. Critically, the sheer numbers of persons 
making themselves Ǯavailableǯ and Ǯresponse-ableǯ today leads not to them 
benefitting from what they deliver, but rather to further losses in solidarity for 
the many and the greater advancement of the few.  
 
In our view it is parties, rather than status groups, that use cultural mores today 
to exercise intimidation and exclusion. In asking the question Ǯ)s he one of us?ǯ 
the parties of reform bear an uncanny resemblance to the introverted and self-
serving parties examined by Michels (1959[1915]) in his analysis of their 
tendency towards oligarchy. The major change we can see is that it is now 
necessary for parties today to recruit from across different status groups. Parties 
today have to wear the mask of democracy and diversity – in order that the party 
can legitimate itself as modern. This is because changes that senior managers 
make in the name of reform  – across government, public institutions, commerce 
and industry – not only seem designed to protect the few from being accountable 
and keep their grip on power (Michels, 1959[1915]), but end up ensnaring them 
in their own inability to get things done.  
 
All this requires a kind of knowing, an ability to read when, and at what 
moments, to answer the calls to reform and so attempt these shifts in world-
making. Thus, rather than treat habitus as solely concerned with what makes 
people stick with where they belong, we want to suggest the name of the 
contemporary game is a capacity for detachment; especially the kind of 
detachment that makes possible immediate and practical extensions that garner 
new attachments (see also Strathern, 1991). Possibly this relates to the Ǯanalyticǯ 
ability identified by Savage (this issue), but as likely a schooling in analysis may 
also instil the kind of detachment that facilitates what elsewhere we call Ǯmotilityǯ (Latimer and Munro, 2006). 
 
Consequently, those seeking some explanation for a chasm opening up between 
senior executive pay and middle management, or the over-taking of the 
professions by senior managers, (Savage, this issue) might also note that, for all 
the emphasis on reform, hierarchy remains the main mechanism at work along 
which credit and rewards travel upward while blame and responsibility are 
divested down.  
 
Indeed, it is hard not to suspect that much reform aids and abets the creation of a 
new class division between a magic circle of the already elect – including so-
called transformational leaders and Ǯchange mastersǯ (Kanter, 1983) – and those 
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potential recruits Ǯstanding in advanceǯ, left waiting to buy into (in the 
managerial phrase) to the next reform.  Reforms that replace institutional ethos 
with the cult of leadership, bring in profit budgets to sensitise managers to 
markets, or impose governance and audit cultures, not only make people 
vulnerable and precarious, such reforms also drive out discretion from the front 
line, and therefore need to be researched in the future as central to the formation 
of (possibly) new kinds of class relations.  
 
In summary of these thoughts we should clarify that we suspect that responding 
to the calls of the various parties of reform, as often as not, is to be asked to look 
away, to not notice whatǯs really happening. For us the pertinent question to ask 
in all this remains: Who benefits from endless reform? And if the answer – at 
least for the moment – is no more than to recognise how benefits are skewed to 
an Ǯeliteǯ working on behalf of the owners of capital, then it is time to go beyond 
stratification models in favour of returning to an analysis of class relations; one 
that pointedly investigates changes in the wider understandings of culture in an 
attempt to understand who has the say in world-making; and investigates how 
they get it. For the moment it is not only a reduction of capitalism to the 
economic, but also the abbreviation of culture and consumption to the purchase 
of a few goods, that holds back understanding the complexities of class relations. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Uprooting is the world made precarious. Our premise is that tacking on (possibly 
spurious) consumption data to stratification models is of little use in helping to 
see what is happening to class in a phase of modernity bent on tearing up its 
foundations. This is not only to reaffirm that conflating class with patterns of 
consumption for status groups creates conflictual classification. On top of noting 
that Savage et al (2013) remain caught in modernityǯs preoccupation with 
reform and technologies of grading, we are emphasising how the exhaustive use 
of ranking devices to drive reform brings about a general precariousness. It is 
this endless stress on making success and failure visible that destabilises and 
unsettles any certainties over class positions and intensifies the Western 
proclivity to dwell in the Ǯmode of comparisonǯ (Strathern 1997).  
 
In this paper we have drawn attention to how the welter of reforms in the UK 
over the last half-century have worked to shift modernity away from a culture 
that values service to the community, strives for equality, treasures its 
institutions and is amenable to redistributing wealth. Contrastingly, the current 
discourse of Ǯworking smartǯ on top of Ǯworking hardǯ appears promoted by 
cultures vested in competition and self-interest. These cultures promulgate a Ǯtyranny of transparencyǯ (Strathern, 2000b) and occlude the social benefit of 
institutions for the shibboleth that successful individuals must be rewarded 
disproportionately. However much the former kind of culture may be critiqued 
for perpetuating false consciousness, the barefaced proselytising by proponents 
of the latter can still take oneǯs breath away! 
 
15 
It is not part of our analysis to settle whether changes wrought by reform end up 
with owners of capital engrossing themselves in their greed or whether they 
represent the swansong of capitalism, a final intake of wealth ahead of the rage 
against appropriation. Instead a first aim has been to emphasise the importance 
of linking culture more generally to the changing nature of modernity. Here, 
against those fearing a postmodernism that relativizes choice to Ǯanything goesǯ, 
we have explored how culture in the UK appears to have degenerated to 
extolling a Ǯcreative destructionǯ that sets out to devalue value to profit and de-
regulate the state to the extent that Ǯeverything goesǯ.  
 
A second aim of this paper has been to argue that nothing less than a full re-
appraisal of the cultural conditions underpinning modernity is required for any 
rethinking of class theory. In this respect Savage et al (2013) appear to have 
fallen into the trap frequented by modernisers, that of pressing for Ǯreformǯ – 
which in their case amounts to appending some extra, and potentially spurious, 
data about consumption onto socio-economic categories that are already 
defunct. Just segmenting off the consumption of certain goods as Ǯculturalǯ, and 
failing to examine the consumption of other commodities, including what is 
tantamount to the trafficking of human endeavour, makes an artefactual error. 
But more than this, it overlooks the contemporary conditions in which 
production is dominated by a volatility on which Ǯreformingǯ parties thrive.  
 
A third aim has been to highlight how demands for reform get exhibited in the 
various agendas though which parties claim to represent others and act as their 
spokespersons. While drawing on Weberǯs ideas of stratification to point out his 
separation of status and class, what we have emphasised (to update Weberǯs 
definition) is how parties form and reform themselves alongside status and class. 
Perhaps managerialism, with its discourse of efficiency and budgets, has the 
upper-hand over the UKǯs institutional framework, but such a tag wipes out the 
ways in which reform complicates and makes more complex the picture of divide 
and rule. It especially over-simplifies by blurring over the struggles between 
different parties across all walks of life as they promote their agendas for 
ascendency and power.  
 
Time and energy, as Skeggs (2011: 509) reminds us, is how Marx saw labour 
power. Skeggsǯ insight is to stress how Ǯtime and energy can be given to othersǯ 
rather than only Ǯextracted fromǯ them. This is why culture matters to class: 
culture is key to understanding how labour power is appropriated in all manner 
of ways from those Ǯstanding in advanceǯ by leaders of parties. For example, Watsonǯs (1994) study is illuminating of how much time and energy middle 
managers spend just trying to work out the agendas of their senior managers 
(see also Munro, 1995). In this respect, future research could focus more 
carefully on how time and energy is reallocated by virtue of class divisions 
within institutions. These might include the division which, on the one hand, 
reserves recognition of decision-making to so-called leaders making policy and 
strategy and, on the other, passes the buck of implementation over to the class Ǯstanding in advanceǯ – the many left to work out what to do in order to succeed 
or fail. 
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